Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 2

Article 4

Fall 9-1-1958

Two Problems In Estate Administration In Virginia: Disposition Of
Income And Payment Of Interest On Legacies
Edward S. Graves
J. Frank Shepherd

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Edward S. Graves and J. Frank Shepherd, Two Problems In Estate Administration In Virginia:
Disposition Of Income And Payment Of Interest On Legacies, 15 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 198 (1958).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol15/iss2/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XV

TWO PROBLEMS IN ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
IN VIRGINIA:
DISPOSITION OF INCOME AND PAYMENT OF INTEREST
ON LEGACIES
EDWARD

S.

GRAVES*

and J. FRANK

SHEPHERDt

The executor of a decedent, operating under the high standard
imposed upon all fiduciaries, must carefully and expeditiously discharge his fundamental duties of collecting the assets and paying all
proper obligations of the estate, including taxes, and of distributing the
entire balance to those designated by the testator to receive it. The executor will generally receive earnings upon the property held during
administration, even though requirements of liquidity may make the
rate of earnings comparatively small; and the earnings must be accounted for with the same meticulous care as the corpus.
The intention of the testator being the polar star to guide the executor in distributing the property and its earnings, primary reliance
must be upon the provisions of the will. If the will is silent, or its provisions confused or illegal, the executor must rely upon the law. If
the applicable statutes and case law fail to provide the proper guide,
then the executor may, and probably will, resort to the court, of which
he is temporarily serving as an officer, for instructions. Such a proceeding may well be cumbersome and expensive, and may delay the orderly
completion of administration.
There is one area in which the Virginia executor, unless the testator's draftsman has been astute enough to include express directions in
the will, is in quite a quandary. This area is that involving the disposition of earnings upon the property held, and the payment of interest
upon gifts. The particular problems are whether the beneficiaries of
different kinds of gifts are entitled to income or interest; when interest
begins to be payable; and what part of income received must be added
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to corpus (i.e., capitalized) and what part distributed. The reason why
the Virginia executor is in such a quandary is that the state of the law
is still, despite consideration and action by the court and the General
Assembly, confused and obscure.
The questions have been discussed in several Virginia cases decided
by the Court of Appeals over the last sixty years,' in a carefully written
opinion by Judge Brockenbrough Lamb of the Richmond Chancery
Court,2 and a timely law review article written by Mr. Thomas C.
Gordon, Jr., of the Richmond Bar.3 As a result of Judge Lamb's opinion and of Mr. Gordon's article, the Virginia General Assembly acted
in the matter on two separate occasions. In 1947, it enacted our present
section 64-684 and in 1948 it enacted section 55-255.1. 5
The enactment of the so-called marital deduction provisions in
the Internal Revenue Act of 1948,6 with the consequent execution of
numerous wills designed to take advantage of this opportunity for tax
minimization, has made the entire problem even more acute.
Consequently, at the risk of repeating much of what has been discussed before, it is believed worthwhile to go over the ground again,
to the end that comprehensive legislative action may possibly be taken,
and that cautious draftsmen may aid testators in making certain by
their wills what is uncertain in the law. It will be understood, of course,
that the case and statute law are both subject to the expressed intention
of the testator; and the discussion of existing law is based on the assumption that the testator has not given express directions governing
the subject matter.
I. THE GENERAL LAW
The law in jurisdictions other than Virginia will not be discussed
in detail. Suffice it to say that Professor Scott has stated that the rules
generally applicable are to the following effect:
'Muse v. Muse, 186 Va. 914, 45 S.E.2d 158 (1947); Rosenberger v. Rosenberger, 184
Va. 1024, 57 S.E.2d 55 (1946); Missionary Society v. Children's Hospital, 163 Va. 114,
176 S.E. 193 (1934); Denny v. Searles, 15o Va. 701, 143 S.E. 484 (1928); Armentrout
v. Armentrout, 112 Va. 660, 72 S.E. 721 (1911); Moorman v. Crocket, 90 Va. 185,

17 S.E. 875 (1893).
'Dew v. Perkinson's Executor, Opinions of Brockenbrough Lamb 218 (1946).
A reprint of this decision has been distributed by the Trust Department, First
and Merchants National Bank of Richmond, Virginia.
'Gordon, The Right to Income Earned During Administration, 33 Va. L. Rev.
368 (1947).
Va. Code Ann. § 64-68 (195o), Va. Acts 1947, Extra Sess., c. 22.
rVa. Code Ann. § 55-255.1 (195o), Va. Acts 1948, c. 78.
GInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
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Specific Legacies. Where a specific legacy is given outright, or in
trust to pay the income to one beneficiary for life with remainder over,
the legatee, or life beneficiary, is entitled to any income accruing
thereon from the date of the death of the testator, even though the
legacy is not payable until the end of the period of administration. 7
General Pecuniary Legacies. In the case of a general pecuniary
legacy given outright rather than in trust, the legatee, according to the
weight of authority, is not entitled to any interest or income until the
expiration of the period of administration, as fixed under applicable
law. s If the legatee is not paid at the end of the statutory period, then
he is entitled to simple interest at the legal rate from the end of such
period. But, if such legacy is given in trust, the legatee is "presumptively entitled to income from the date of the testator's death." 9
Residuary Gifts. A third category is the residuary disposition to a
beneficiary for life or years, with remainder over. Under the weight of
authority, the first beneficiary is entitled to income from the date of
the death of the testator. The same rule applies to the donee of an outright gift of the residue. 10
In jurisdictions that follow the English rule, any income which has
accrued (prior to sale) upon residuary assets sold to pay debts or other
expenses is capitalized and becomes a part of the corpus of the fund.
The Massachusetts rule is that the life tenant of the residuum is entitled
to income from the date of the testator's death even on assets sold during administration. 1
According to the general law, then, donees of general pecuniary
legacies are entitled to receive from the estate interest beginning when
administration should be completed; donees of specific legacies are entitled to income from the testator's death; donees of gifts in trust are
entitled to income from the testator's death; and donees under the
72 Scott, Trusts § 234 (1939).

8
lbid. While this is stated as the generally accepted rule, and it is thought that
it was at one time the rule in Virginia, attention must be called to what has been
termed a possible exception. In Hite v. Hite, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 409 (1824), it was stated
that as a general rule interest on a general pecuniary legacy is payable one year from
the testator's death. However, the holding was that if such a legacy was given by a
parent to his child, then the "interest" was to be computed from the date of the
death of the testator only if he stood in loco parentis. See also Couch v. Eastman, 29
W. Va. 784, 3 S.E. 23 (1887). Cf. Granberry v. Granberry, 1 Va. (I Wash.) 246 (1793),
where it was stated that there was no general rule as to an executor's paying interest.
92 Scott, Trusts § 234.2, at 1278 (1939).
"Id. at § 234.3.
"Proctor v. American Security & Trust Co., 98 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See
Rosenberger v. Rosenberger, note 1 supra.
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residuary clause for life or a period, or of an outright gift, are entitled
to income from the testator's death, except that, in jurisdictions following the English rule, income earned by assets subsequently used
to pay obligations of the estate is not distributable, but is added to
corpus.
Distinction between income and interest. It will thus be seen that a
distinction is made between income and interest. As these terms are
used in this field, income may be defined as the earnings which accrue
upon the property held as corpus; interest may be defined as an amount
equal to a certain fixed percentage of the corpus of the gift, irrespective
of the actual productivity of the property. Possibly in the days past,
when personal representatives invested the corpus in real estate bonds,
bearing the same rate of interest as the rate fixed by law, and invested
the bulk of the estate immediately, it was six of one and half a dozen
of the other. In these days when demands for cash during administration are high, especially for succession taxes, and the interest earned on
liquid securities varies, it is highly improbable that the rate of income
will equal the legal interest rate, still 6 per cent in Virginia. 12
Irrespective of this consideration, the beneficiaries entitled to income and those entitled to interest occupy different positions toward
the estate. As Judge Lamb pointed out:
"The pecuniary legatee claiming interest is asserting a claim
adverse to the estate, because he has no claim to any particular
property, or any particular fund, which could by any stretch of
the imagination be deemed to be earning income for him. He
asserts his claim with equal force, and like result, whether the
estate has earned income in the interim or has been wholly barren.
"On the other hand a life tenant of the residuum when he asserts claim to interim income, asserts a claim to what has been
earned by the property left for his benefit; and the claim is not
asserted adversely against the estate or any other beneficiary. The
life tenant is claiming only the yield that was left him by the will,
only what has been actually received by way of income from the
particular property dedicated by the will to produce income for
him; or, if he be the life tenant of the residuum, from the equity
of that particular property ...-,13

No note seems to have been taken of this difference by the highest
Virginia court in the various cases in which the question has been involved.
'2Va. Code Ann. § 6-346 (1950).
"Dew v. Perkinson's Executor, Opinions of Brockenbrough Lamb 218,

219

(1946).
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4
ChronologicalDevelopment. In discussing the Virginia authorities'
the preliminary observation should be made that many of the estates involved various difficulties of administration. In Moorman v. Crockettla
and Denny v. Searles,16 the testators' widows renounced the wills; in
the Denny case, there were quite difficult problems of disposing of unproductive real estate and settling the accounts of the first fiduciary;
and in Rosenberger v. Rosenberger,17 there were unexplained delays
in the qualification of the executors and in the progress of administration. Doubtless some of the confusion of the law is attributable to
the fact that courts are faced primarily with the duty of meting out
justice to the individuals involved in the particular case; and in doing
so, they quite often necessarily depart from textbook rules.
Also by way of preliminary, it is believed that, because of the confusion in the law, a chronological consideration of pertinent cases in
the last sixty years will be helpful before an effort is made to state
what the rules in Virginia appear to be.
The Moorman case,' 8 decided in 1893, involved a legacy of $io,ooo
(to be comprised of money, bonds and accounts receivable) in trust for
the testator's granddaughter. Without discussing whether the beneficiary was entitled to income or interest, the court assumed that interest
was payable, and addressed itself to the question of the date when interest began accruing. The decision was that the interest began one year
after the testator's death. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied
upon section 2706 of the Code of 1887, reading in pertinent part as
follows:

"A personal representative shall not be compelled to pay any
legacy given by the will, or make distribution of the estate of his
decedent, until after a year from the date of the order conferring
authority on the first executor or administratorof such decedent ... "19
Three comments should be made upon the opinion. In the first
place, the court dated interest from one year after the testator's death,
but cited a statute giving the date prior to which distribution could not
be compelled as one year after the qualification of the executor. The
"4See notes 1, 2, and 3 supra.
5go Va. 185, 17 S.E. 875 (1893).
1i5o Va. 701, 143 S.E. 484 (1928).
Va. 1024, 37 S.E.2d 55 (1946).

27184

"Moorman v. Crockett, go Va. 185, 17 S.E. 875 (1893).
'The corresponding section is now Va. Code Ann. § 64-167 (1950), with the applicable period being six months rather than one year. (Emphasis added.)
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non sequitur was not explained. In the second place, a gift in trust
was treated as if it were an outright legacy. In the third place, the court
did not spell out the basis for its holding; and one is left to speculation. One theory would be that the beneficiary's right to interest is
based upon his showing that the personal representative was at fault in
not making a distribution at the time (whenever it is) when he could be
compelled to make distribution. If this is the theory, then one would
expect to find some discussion of the matter. Perhaps circumstances
exist which would excuse the executor for not making distribution precisely on time, and, if so, interest would run from the time when he is
delinquent.2 0 At any rate, if the executor is at fault, it would seem that
2
he should be held liable for interest, not the estate. 1
A second theory is that, when the time that distribution can be
compelled has arrived, then the gift is transformed into something
like a debt; and interest begins to run, according to the usual rule,
when the debt is due. 2 It would be somewhat difficult to persuade a

testator, who regards himself as in the role of a benefactor, that he is
to become legally indebted to an object of his bounty; it is believed that
while he might be willing to fix a date when a beneficiary should begin
to receive earnings upon the property given, he would not be pleased at
a rule which transforms a donee into a creditor, entitled to demand
interest at the legal rate from his estate, irrespective of what the property earns.
Eighteen years later, in Armentrout v. Armentrout,23 the court considered a provision by which the testator directed that $1,2oo be paid
to beneficiaries by his children, who were to receive his property at
the termination of a life estate in his widow.2 4 The court held that
the testator did not intend that his children should pay the $1,200
until after they received the property, and so the pecuniary legacies
did not bear interest until the widow's death. By way of dictum, however, the court stated that the general rule is that legacies begin to
bear interest one year from the testators death.
See Denny v. Searles, 150 Va. 701, 143 S.E. 484 (1928,) discussed infra at n. 25,

which seems based on this ,theory.
21
Preston v. Davis, 102 Va. 178, 45 S.E. 865 (1903); 8 Michie's Jur., Executors & Administrators § 214; 33 C.J.S. Exectors & Administrators § 213.
uBurruss v. Baldwin, i99 Va. 883, 1o3 S.E.2d 249 (1958), rehearing denied, June
12, 1958.
n1 1 2 Va. 660, 72 S.E. 721 (1911).

-The testator by his will devised and bequeathed his entire estate (composed
cniefly of real estate) to his wife for life, with remainder in fee to four of his children
and directed that the children mentioned should pay the sum of $4oo.oo to each
of his three remaining children. The three legacies of 4oo.oo each constituted a
charge upon the estate in remainder.
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The same rule that would apply, under the Moorman case, to pecuniary gifts in trust would consequently apply to such gifts made outright. The Denny case, 25 decided by the Special Court of Appeals in
1928, is a notable example of an opinion in which the court said the
law is one way, but held another. Here, as in the Moorman case, there
was a general pecuniary legacy to be held in trust. Again the court did
not even discuss the question of the difference between income and
interest (although the testator had expressly provided that income
upon the legacy should be paid to the legatee); it even seemed at one
place in its discussion to treat the two terms as synonymous. 26 Considerable nonproductive real property was involved, which was being sold
from time to time, but the court did not go into the question of allocation between life tenant and remainderman of the eventual sales
proceeds. 27 The court stated that the general rule was that the beneficiary of a legacy was entitled to interest beginning one year after the
death of the testator, but that this rule had been changed in Virginia
by a statute, which was not cited, so that interest began one year from
the date of the qualification of the personal representative. Presumably the court was referring to the same section, 2706 of the Code of
1887 (carried over unchanged into the Code of 1919 as section 5437),
which had been cited by the court in the Moorman case; and was, in
reliance on this statute, changing the beginning date specified by the
holding in the Moorman case 28 and the dictum in the Armentrout
case.29 These two latter cases, it will be recalled, stated that interest
began to run one year from the testator's death. At any rate, the court
went on to hold that the beneficiary of the gift of a pecuniary legacy
in trust was entitled to interest, but only upon "the liquidated assets
when they came into [the executor's] ...possession for distribution."3 0
The court doubtless felt that special circumstances compelled a departure both from what it stated to be the general rule, and from the
new Virginia rule which it created. The decision was so explained later
in the Rosenberger case. 31 It may, on the other hand, have acted upon
the first theory above postulated: that interest is payable only from the
-15o Va. 701, 143 S.E. 484 (1928).
'1Id. at 729.
- See 2 Scott, Trusts § 240 (1939), for a discussion of the allocation of the sales

price of unproductive property between the life tenant and remainderman.
2
19o Va. 185, 196, 17 S.E. 875 (1893).
2112
Va. 66o, 664, 72 S.E. 721 (1911).
so15o Va. 701, 720, 143 S.E. 484 (1928).
1184 Va. 1024, 37 S.E.2d 55 (1946).
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time a legacy is wrongfully withheld by the executor from the legatee.
32
In the next case, however, Missionary Society v. Children's Hospital,
the court, considering outright general pecuniary legacies, did not take
advantage of the opportunity to discuss the basis for the rules, but
quoted from both cases as follows:
"In the case of Armentrout v. Armentrout's Executors, 112
Va. 66o, 72 S.E. 721, it is held: 'When legacies are payable by the
executors out of the estate of the decedent in his hands to be administered, the general rule is that they are payable at the end
of the year from the death of the testator, with interest from that
date, unless some other time is fixed by the will when interest
is to begin.'
"And in Denny v. Searles, 150 Va. 701, 143 S.E. 484, 493,
where it was argued that the rule about interest is different in
Virginia from other States, this court said: 'This position is incorrect. The rule that a legacy bears interest from the end of the year
after the death of the testator is a general rule (subject to exceptions) established by the Chancellors of England and adopted
by all the States so far as we have been able to discover. In Virginia, however, by statute, interest begins to run from the end 3of
the year after the qualification of the personal representative."
Furthermore, the court also cast considerable doubt upon the estate's
ability to assert that special circumstances existed which excused a delay in distribution, saying:
"And this is true although the fund out of which the legacy is
payable is wholly unproductive, or where the delay in the payment of the legacy, due to the fact that the validity of the will
obstacles, or
was in litigation, or the legatee himself 3interposed
4
assets sufficient were not then available."
The holding of the court is in accordance with the new Virginia rule
created in the Denny case: That outright pecuniary legacies bear interest beginning one year from the date of qualification of the personal
representative.
The Rosenberger case,35 decided in 1946, really did not involve
interest versus income at all. The will provided for outright gifts of
cash and tangible personal property; the donee, who was one of the
executors, simply took possession of this property, as well as a farm
in which she was given a life estate; and questions of her receiving
interest thereon or income therefrom were not raised. The principal
2163 Va. 114, 176 S.E. 193 (1934).
-Id. at 134.
3Id. at 135.
=184 Va. 1024, 37 S.E.2d 55 (1946).
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issue concerned income received upon assets in the residuum, which
was left to the same donee for life and then over. The question was
whether Virginia should adopt the English rule under which income
accruing upon assets sold during administration to satisfy claims against
the estate (debts, administration expenses and taxes) is capitalized; or
should adopt the Massachusetts rule under which such income retains
its character as income. In discussing this question, however, and
bolstering its statement that the question had already been decided in
Virginia, the court went over the Moorman, Armentrout, Denny and
Missionary Society cases; cited all with apparent approval; took cognizance of the fact that section 27o6 had been amended to shorten the
one-year period mentioned in the statute to six months; and stated,
by way of dictum, that pecuniary legacies bear interest from six months
after the qualification of the personal representative. Whether the
court was discussing only outright gifts, or gifts in trust as well, is not
made clear; outright gifts were involved in the Armentrout and Missionary Society cases, while the Moorman and Denny cases involved
gifts in trust.
Upon the issue actually involved, the court held that income accrued upon assets sold during administration to pay claims must be
capitalized, thereby adopting the English rule. 36 It went further, however, and held that income accruing during the six-month period
following the date of qualification of the personal representative must
also be capitalized. Its reasoning must have been that the life tenant
(or the trustee for her) was not entitled to demand delivery of the assets for six months after the personal representative qualified; so the
estate was consequently not "indebted" to the life tenant during this
period. The remainderman certainly was not entitled to the income because his right had not accrued; therefore, since something must be
done with the income, it would be added to corpus.
The case is the more interesting because the executors did not
qualify until ten months after the testator died.37 It therefore presents
a good example of the impracticability of the rule that interest begins
to run from the date of the qualification of the personal representative.
The rule that interest begins one year after the death of the testator
at least has the advantage of uniformity; to use the date of the qualification of the personal representative is, as the Rosenberger case demonstrates, to use a variable. Judge Lamb, in the Dew case,38 envisions a
MId. at io3g.
Id. at 1027.
-"Opinions of Brockenbrough Lamb 218 (1946).
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situation in which the personal representative does not qualify for
four and one-half years after the testator's death. Surely no testator
ever intended that the payment of interest, even if he approved the
creation of a debtor-creditor relationship between the estate and a
beneficiary, would depend upon the time when the personal representative happens to qualify.
At any rate, the life tenant in the Rosenberger case was held entitled
to income accrued during the ten months intervening between the
testator's death and the qualification of the executors (except upon
assets later sold to satisfy claims against the estate); the income received for the next six months was capitalized; then the right of the
life tenant to receive income was resumed.
Doubtless most lawyers would recoil from the prospect of explaining the law, as developed thus far, to a testator who would be careful or
curious enough to inquire about the matter of interest and income
during the period following his death and until the administration of
his estate had been completed.
The story does not, however, end here. Later in 1946, Judge Lamb
39
wrote his opinion in Dew v. Perkinson's Executor. Here, as in the
Rosenberger case, the only question in issue was the capitalization of
income. Judge Lamb held that only the income accruing upon assets
sold to pay claims should be capitalized. Despite the Rosenberger case,
he refused to capitalize other income accruing during the six-month
period following the qualification of the executor; and he justified
his refusal upon the ground that the Rosenberger case involved peculiar
circumstances not appearing in connection with the estate involved.
Judge Lamb expressed frankly, by way of discussion obiter, considerable concern over the Supreme Court of Appeals' application of section 27o6, as amended, to any of the instant questions, as well as its
failure to distinguish between interest and income. He addressed a
plea to the General Assembly to clarify what was payable, and when,
upon general pecuniary legacies. The Legislature responded in 1947
by enacting a statute which now appears as section 64-68 of the Code
and reads as follows:
"Unless a contrary intent is expressed in or to be implied
from a will, interest on pecuniary legacies shall begin to run at
of one year after the date of the death of the
the expiration
40
testator."
It will be noted in passing that the Legislature, following the example
8Ibid.
'0Va. Code Ann. § 64-68 (1950).
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of the courts, did not recognize the difference between legacies given
outright and those given in trust; nor did it distinguish between general and specific pecuniary legacies.
Mr. Gordon's article, 41 which was published in May 1957, after the
Dew opinion and the enactment of section 64-68, again reviewed the
situation and expressed considerable concern over the confusion in
the law generally, and especially the capitalization rule laid down in
the Rosenberger case. He noted the opinion in the Dew case, but
pointed out that it was the opinion of a lower court, and so could only
be regarded as one man's interpretation of the Rosenberger case.
Mr. Gordon also concluded with an appeal to the Legislature. He
recommended that the Massachusetts rule, rather than the English
rule, be made effective in Virginia; and to accomplish this, that the
following be enacted:
"Where an annuity or the income from property, real or personal, is given by will to or in trust for a tenant or tenants, such
tenant or tenants shall be entitled to receive the same from the
date of death of the testator.
"Where the whole or any part of the residuary estate is devised or bequeathed to a trust fund for a tenant or tenants, all income earned from the date of death of the testator through the
period of administration by the personal representative, and not
payable to others or otherwise disposed of by the will shall not
be added to the principal of the residuary estate, but shall be dis42
tributed as income to the tenant or tenants entitled thereto.
In 1948 the General Assembly enacted the second paragraph of this
proposed legislation, which is now codified as section 55-255.1;43 but
unfortunately failed to adopt the first paragraph. It is strongly arguable,
therefore, that the Legislature intended to leave the state of the law
governing matters of income from or interest upon gifts, other than
residual ones, in the condition in which the law was then; and that
the Legislature did not intend that the donee of a gift in trust of other
than residual property should receive income thereon from the date
of the death of the testator.
The year before this legislation was enacted, that is, in 1947, the
Supreme Court of Appeals decided Muse v. Muse.44 Section 64-68 could
not be applied because the testator had died before it became effective.
"Gordon, The Right to Income Earned During Administration, 33 Va. L. Rev.
368 (1947). The Dew case was decided in November 1946, and § 64-68 was enacted on
January 29, 1947.

at 378.
"Va. Code Ann. § 55-255.1 (195o). This statute became effective March 3, 1948.
"x86 Va. 914, 45 S.E.2d 158 (1947).
4Id.
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The court held that the donee of a life estate in real property was entitled to the income from the date of death; and also that the donee
of a general pecuniary legacy, given outright and not in trust, was entitled to interest from one year after the testator's death. Citing the
Missionary Society and Rosenberger cases as if they had clearly set out
this last rule, the court said that section 64-68 had been a statutory
adoption of the rule "applied" in these cases. It will be remembered
that the Missionary Society case had held that interest on a general
pecuniary legacy ran from one year after the qualification of the personal representative and that the Rosenberger discussion had, by
way of dictum, indicated that interest ran from six months after such
qualification.
This completes the chronological account; and, in view of the confused state of the law, a short summary might be helpful:
i. The donee of an outright general pecuniary legacy is entitled to
interest beginning one year from the testator's death. Section 64-68;
Muse v. Muse.
2. If the general pecuniary legacy is left in trust, the rule is doubtful.
Should it be held that section 64-68 applies to gifts in trust, then the
rule would be the same as if it were left outright. If section 64-68 does
not apply, then one must trace through holdings and dicta in the
Moorman, Denny, Rosenberger and Muse cases. The holding in the
first was that interest was payable beginning one year after the testator's
death; the holding in the Denny case was that interest was payable
from the time liquid assets came into the executor's hands for distribution. The dictum in the Denny case was that interest was payable
beginning six months after the qualification of the personal representative. The Rosenberger case cited both the Moorman and the Denny
cases with approval; and the Muse case, in turn, cited the Rosenberger
case with approval. The general rule, outside of Virginia, is that a gift
of a general pecuniary legacy in trust entitles the beneficiary to income
from the testator's death. Probably the rule in Virginia is that the
beneficiary is entitled to interest from six months after the executor's
qualification; but it is also possible that the court might follow the
general rule and that it might apply the statute.
3. The donee of a specific legacy or devise is entitled to the income
therefrom from the testator's death, whether the gift is outright or in
trust. While Virginia authority is sparse, it is believed that the Muse
case, coupled with the general law, would sustain this conclusion, unless section 64-68 of the Code was intended to apply to specific pecuniary legacies, in which event they would receive different treatment.
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4. Donees of residuary gifts, outright or in trust, are entitled to
income from the testator's death. This is settled by section 55-255.1 of
the Code.
One more aspect of the problem should be considered. Does income
mean gross or net income? Must executor's commissions on income,
for example, be paid out of residuary corpus? It is believed that where
the beneficiary is held entitled to income, the word means gross income;
and charges that might be made against it, were the property held in
trust,45 must be paid out of the residue. See, for example, the Rosenberger and Muse cases; and note that section 55-255.1 of the Code flatly
says, "all income." To make the problem, which is complicated enough,
even worse, suppose that an item of property is real estate, requiring
expenses of maintenance and operation, instead of being securities
requiring substantially none. Doubtless the "income" from such property, during the period it was held during administration, would be
gross earnings less such expenses.
With this picture in mind, we turn to a consideration of a presentday will drafted to secure, for Federal Estate Tax purposes, the maximum marital deduction.4 6 In such a will a testator may create two
gifts in the article disposing of the residuary estate, the first to the
spouse, the second to the spouse or others.47 If this is done, section
55-255.1 furnishes clear answers: the beneficiaries are entitled to income, not interest, from the testator's death; and none of the income is
capitalized.
The will may be written, however, so as to give to the spouse, outright or in trust, an amount or a portion of his property equal to onehalf of his adjusted gross estate; and by a subsequent article to dispose
of the residue of his property.48 In both cases, he should use the word
"portion" rather than "amount" because of potential income tax lia49
bility.
4See Uniform Principal and Income Act, Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-253 to 55-268
(950).
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
'T See, e.g., Modem Legal Forms § 9602 (1957); 3 Rabkin & Johnson, Current
Legal Forms, Form 7.13 (1957); Shattuck &- Farr, Estate Planners Handbook,
Form IV (2d ed., 1953)"See, e.g., 3 Rabkin & Johnson, Current Legal Forms, Forms 7.12, 7 .15 A (1957);
Modem Legal Forms §§ 9601, 9602 (alternate), 96o3, 96o4 (1957).
"DSuisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), aff'd, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 573 (1936); Durand, Draftsmanship: Wills and Trusts 7o,
74 (A.B.A. Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, 1957). The argument
of the Internal Revenue Service would be that, where the husband leaves his wife
an "amount" equal to one-half of his adjusted gross estate, the wife is entitled to
receive a fixed sum when values are determined; and that this amount is like a "debt.
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Such a gift comprises a substantial part of the testator's estate; and
the questions whether the donee is entitled to income or interest, and
from what date, are not de minimis.
If the word "amount" is used, and the gift is made outright, it would
seem that section 64-68 applies. The spouse is entitled to no return on
the gift for one year following the testator's death; from then on, the
spouse is entitled to interest. Depending on the length of administration
and the rate of income, the spouse will either receive a return at a less
or greater rate than is actually earned by the property ultimately distributed. So, if the estate is completely administered in a year and a half,
interest will be payable at the rate of slightly over 2 per cent for the
period from the testator's death to the delivery of the property. If the
administration continues for four years, interest will be payable at the
rate of 4Y2 per cent for the entire period.
If the word "portion" is used, it is arguable that the gift partakes of
the nature of a legacy of specific property, at least to the extent that
the gift is satisfied by delivery in kind of property owned by the testator.
If this is so, then the wife would be entitled to the gross income upon
such property from the date of his death.
Suppose the marital deduction gift, instead of being made outright,
is made in trust. If the word "amount" is used, then the same difficulties
in Virginia are created which arise in the case of any general pecuniary
legacy bequeathed in trust. If the word "portion" is used, the situation
would be the same, except to the extent that one might take the position that property delivered in kind from the testator's holdings at his
death should receive the same treatment as a specific legacy.
A somewhat tenuous argument may be made that the marital
deduction gift is really a gift of part of the residuum, whether or
not it is physically a part of the article of the will disposing of residUnless the estate happens to have the amount in cash, and hands it over in this
form, there is likely to be a variation in the "amount" and the value of securities
and cash which the wife receives on the date of actual delivery. So, if the wife is entitled to $5o,ooo, and receives cash of $So,ooo and securities which were worth
$13o,ooo on the valuation date, but were worth $14o,ooo on the date of delivery,
the estate has satisfied the gift with less cost to itself. The analogy between this
situation and that in which a debtor pays a debt with appreciated property would
doubtless be urged; in the latter situation, the debtor is held, in the absence of
special circumstances, to have realized income. See i P-U 1958 Fed. Tax Serv. par.
72 5 4 -A (1958).
The writers do not feel that the Government's position would be sound, for the
reason that a gift, and not a debt, is involved. Nevertheless, the Government doubtless would derive aid and comfort from the present law that, requiring an estate
to pay interest on general pecuniary legacies, appears to create a debtor-creditor
relationship.
For other bothersome tax questions, see infra note 5o.
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uary property. It partakes of the nature of a residuary gift in being
subject to the payment of all obligations of the estate (except, usually,
taxes) and of being precisely ascertainable only when these obligations have been discharged. If such treatment can be given these gifts,
then section 55-255.1 would at least furnish a definite answer to the
problem.

III.

THREE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

There are three possible solutions to the various problems herein
discussed.
A. Litigation.
First, the problems may be presented to the Supreme Court of Appeals, which may then, in the usual way, settle them one, or perhaps
several, at a time. Courts do not, however, decide questions not actually
at issue; and a substantial period may elapse before sufficient cases
are instituted and appeals taken therefrom on all the questions that
ought to be decided.
B. Legislation.
Second, the General Assembly may enact appropriate legislation in
this field. The following is suggested:
"I. Subject to contrary provisions of a will:
"a. No interest shall be payable by the estate of a decedent upon
any gifts made therein, either outright or in trust, whether by way of
specific, general, or residuary legacy or devise.
"b. Proper charges shall be made against gross income by the personal representative; and discretionary powers given by a testator to
his personal representative to determine what constitutes principal and
income and what charges shall be deducted from each shall be respected.
"c. The donee shall be entitled to no interest or income from the
estate where the gift is:
"i. Property over which the personal representative does not
exercise dominion, or
"ii. Nonproductive tangible personal property delivered
in kind.
"d. At the time of each distribution made to satisfy a testamentary gift, the property then held by the personal representative and over
which he has exercised dominion, except unproductive tangible personal property, shall be valued, and the net income received thereupon
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from the testator's death to the date of distribution shall be ascertained.
The distributee shall be entitled to receive the same proportion of such
net income as the value of the property distributed bears to the entire
property held on the date of distribution.
"e. No income received by the personal representative on property of the decedent held during administration shall be added to corpus
but shall retain its character as income. All income not otherwise distributable shall be held for the account of and distribution to residuary
beneficiaries.
"2. Nothing herein contained shall prevent the personal representative from making advances of income during the administration of the
estate."
The first comment, that the contrary express provisions of the testator shall govern, hardly needs to be made. Illustrative provisions that
may be included in the will are set out hereafter.
As to the other provisions, it is believed, in the first place, that
the payment by the estate of interest on gifts is wholly inappropriate.
The testator is making gifts, not creating a debtor-creditor relationship.
If interest payments exceed the average rate of return on the property
held by the estate, the excess must be paid out of other assets of the
estate; and the law has, in effect, compelled the testator to make a
larger gift than he intended. On the other hand, if the delivery is
made before interest is payable on the gift by the estate under current
law, or before the interest equals the average yield of all the estate, the
residuary beneficiaries enjoy the fruits of property never intended for
them. It is believed that most testators, not expressing a contrary direction, would prefer that the beneficiaries share in the net earnings of all
of his property during administration, and that none be singled out for
preferential treatment in this respect5 0
This belief leads, in the second place, to the corollary that the recipients of all gifts should equitably share in the burdens properly
incurred by all the property during administration. It is, of course, not
easy to determine what charges should be made against income, and
what against principal, but trustees have to meet and solve the problem in the regular course of business, aided currently, it is true, by the
Uniform Principal and Income Act. 51 Even if the executor's task is
rendered more difficult, that would seem preferable to making the
t*Tax questions arise. If the interest is not an additional gift, then the recipient
should report it as income, and the estate would be entitled to a deduction. If it
is a gift,
then adjustments should be made in inheritance taxes.
T
Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-253 to 55-268 (1950).
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residuary beneficiaries pay, for example, executors' commissions on, or
income taxes attributable to, the income given to donees of specific
gifts or general pecuniary bequests. In addition, the proper accounting
will be helpful when the time arrives for the preparation of income tax
returns for the estate.
It is recognized, thirdly, that accurate records must be kept to make
possible the reconstruction of net income earned at the time each distribution is made. If there are several specific or general pecuniary
gifts, the executor may see his way clear to satisfy various of these gifts
at different times during administration. Even if records are accurate,
some difficulties may be encountered in an endeavor precisely to attribute income received to the assets held at each time of distribution.
Since, however, the fiduciary should, in the interest of all concerned,
including his own, keep as meticulous records as possible, it is not
anticipated that this necessity will place an undue burden upon the
52
personal representative.
Also, additional valuations will be required if several distributions
are made. Again, however, the fiduciary is inured to the requirement
of making valuations: He makes one, rather loosely, at the time of
qualification, to fix the tentative probate tax and the amount of bond;
another, as accurate as possible, as of the date of death; and another (if
Federal Estate Tax is payable), a year later.53 Unless the estate consists of property without a readily ascertainable market value, an extra
valuation or so should not be too difficult.
The words ".... held by the personal representative and over which

he has exercised dominion..." are recognized to be enigmatic and
definitely to require explanation.
These words are intended to exclude real estate which descends instantly to the donee and over which the executor, even though he may
have the power to do so, exercises no dominion. For example, the
5-Trhe following cases from other jurisdictions held that the equitable procedure
would be to determine the net income received during the entire administration,
and divide it between all trusts in the proportion which the principal amounts of
the respective trusts bore to each other during administration. In the case of a will
creating a marital trust and providing for payment of all taxes from property which
will comprise other trusts, the proportion will be 50-50 up to the time estate and
inheritance taxes were paid; from there on, the proportion will be in favor of the
marital trust. In re Beresford's Estate, 41 N.Y.S.2d 83o (Surr. Ct. 1943); In re Herrington's Estate, ioi Colo. 27, 70 P.2d 337 (937); In re Bond's Estate, zo3 Pa. Super.
553, 157 Ati. 51 (1931); In re Billings' Estate, 137 Misc. 758, 244 N.Y. Supp. 686
(Surr. Ct. 1930). The records and calculations required by the rule imposed in these
cases were as complicated as those that would be required by the legislation here
suggested.
3
6 1nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2032.
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testator may leave his residence to his wife outright. Unless the estate is
not sufficient to pay obligations out of other assets, the executor is not
going to exercise over this real estate any general power given him in
the will to sell realty; in fact, he is going to have nothing to do with it.
The donee of this property will not, under the proposed legislation,
share in any income of the estate, for two reasons: The executor has
not "held" or exercised dominion over the property; and he has not
distributed it to the wife. Her chain of title is not based on any document executed by him.
Personal property, on the other hand, all goes through the executor to the ultimate beneficiary (except small sums which the holder
may pay directly).5 4 Unproductive tangible personal property, delivered to the donees, is essentially in the same category as real estate
over which the executor exercises no dominion. Such property should
not, therefore, carry any income with it, and the proposed statute so
provides. Productive tangible personal property, such as rented machinery and tangible property used in a business of the testator, is
treated like other income-producing property.
There is one situation in which inequity is bound to result. If, for
example, the executor delivers ioo shares of General Electric to a
specific legatee immediately before a dividend is declared, the legatee
will not only receive the dividend, but will also share in the net income
of the estate otherwise realized. The same inequity will, however, always occur where property is delivered before, or during periods at
the end of which, it will yield income; and it is not believed wise to
introduce further complications into an already sufficiently complicated
picture in an effort to take care of an almost inherent difficulty, which
the executor can minimize, if he sees substantial injustice, by a judicious
timing of deliveries.
Subsection "e"prevents the capitalization of income on assets sold
to pay obligations, continuing in this respect the legislation suggested
by Mr. Gordon's article.55 The reasons why the Massachusetts rule
should be preferred over the English are so well stated in his discussion
that they will not be set out again.56 Nor is any effort made by the pro-Va. Code Ann. §§ 6-54, 6-188, 8-750 (1950).
'-Gordon, The Right to Income Earned During Administration, 33 Va. L. Rev.
368, 378 (1947).
WThere is a third rule under which income received during administration is
apportioned. This rule is stated in the Restatement of Trusts § 234 (1935), Comment
g,as follows: "A proper method of determining the extent to which legacies, debts
and expenses of administration should be paid out of principal is by ascertaining
the amount which with interest thereon at the rate of return received by the executor upon the whole estate from the death of the testator to the dates of payment
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posed legislation to specify what is income and what is principal, or to
interfere with any discretion which the testator may have vested in
the executor to make this determination. That question would require
an article in itself; sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.
It should be emphasized that, in requiring the estate to pay only
average net income to beneficiaries, and never to pay interest, there is
no implication that a beneficiary is precluded from seeking to impose
upon a delinquent personal representative any proper sanction-loss
of commissions,57 the obligation to pay interest, 5 8 or whatnot. The
liability for the misdoings of the personal representative should be
placed where it belongs-i.e., on him, and not on the estate.
Paragraph 2 would make it clear that the executor is not precluded
from making advancements of income during administration to those
ultimately entitled to income. In these days when a year must go by
before estate taxes are determined, it is not unusual for the administration to last for two years; and unless the testator has taken care of
the needs of his dependents by insurance payable directly to them, or
otherwise, they may very well need support before the time has arrived
for ultimate distribution.
C. Drafting.
The third possibility for solving the problems is that the draftsman
will bring them to the testator's attention and have him state what his
wishes are. The following are suggested clauses, simplified to illustrate
the point here discussed:
Ai. I give and bequeath to X ioo shares of the common stock of the
General Electric Company. It is my desire that such stock shall be delivered to the said X as soon as possible after my death, and that, irrespective of the date of delivery, the gross income received thereupon,
without deductions for expenses of transfer charges, cost of administration, or other charges, shall be paid over to him.
A2. I give and bequeath to X oo shares of the common stock of the
General Electric Company, to be delivered to the said X upon the

would equal the amounts paid. This amount is charged to principal and the balance
of the amount paid is charged to income."
This third rule is that actually followed in England, where it is called the rule
of Allhusen v. Whittell, L.R. 4 Eq. 295 (1867). The rule is totally impractical and
would present many more pitfalls than either the Massachusetts rule or what is
most frequently called in this country, and is called in this article, the English
rule. See Solving Three Administration Problems Under Marital Deduction, Trusts
& Estates 421 (May 1958).
1Va.
Code Ann. § 26-19 (195o).
58
See note 21 supra.
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completion of the administration of my estate,5 9 or two years from
my death, whichever event first occurs. Any cash dividends upon said
stock shall be disposed of as a part of the residuum of my estate.
Bi. I give and bequeath to Y the sum of 55,ooooo, to be paid as
soon after my death as possible. If said sum is paid within six months
from my death, the said Y shall be entitled to receive from my estate
the said 55,ooo.oo only; if payment is not made within such time, the
said Y shall receive interest upon said sum, at the rate of 5 per cent
per annum, until said sum is paid over; said interest shall be payable
out of the earnings upon the residuum of my estate or out of the principal thereof if said earnings are insufficient.
B,2. I give and bequeath to Y the sum of $5,ooo.oo. Said sum shall be
payable to Y, without income or interest, upon the completion of the
administration of my estate.
Ci. i give, bequeath and devise to Z my office building located at
1o5A Main Street, together with all my tangible personal property
located therein. The operation of said building shall be assumed by
the said Z immediately upon my death; and she shall be entitled to all
income therefrom and shall pay all expenses thereof, prorated as of the
date of my death.
C2. I give, devise and bequeath to Z my office building located at
1o5A Main Street, together with all my tangible personal property
located therein; provided, however, that until the administration of
my estate is completed, my executor shall take charge of, manage and
operate said property. And during such time all income therefrom shall
be paid into the residuum of my estate, and all expenses thereof, including, but not restricted to, taxes, utilities, maintenance and management, shall be paid, in the order hereafter stated, out of said income,
the earnings upon my residuum, and the corpus thereof.
If the testator has provided for two trusts, a marital trust in, say,
Article V, and a residuary trust in Article VI, he may provide as follows:
"Article VII. The trusts created by Articles V and VI of this, my
last will and testament, shall not be entitled to any interest on any of
the assets thereof during the administration of my estate. The net income earned on assets held by my Executors during the administration

c"It is recognized that no one really knows when a Virginia estate is completed.
To be technical, one should provide "Upon the approval of my executor's final
account," instead of "Upon the completion of the administration of my estate."
And even so, "final account" should be defined as the first account so labelled, filed
by the executor.
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of my estate, and not otherwise disposed of by other articles of this will,
shall, upon the completion of the administration of my estate, be divided between the trusts created in Article V and Article VI hereof in the
same proportion in which the value of the corpus of each trust created
therein bears to the value of all of the trusts created therein. The
value of the corpus of each trust, for the purpose of determining the
allocation of income, shall be the value finally determined for inheritance and/or estate tax purposes. Prior to such ultimate determination,
my Executors, in their discretion, may make advances of income to the
said trusts. None of such income shall be capitalized, whether or not
the assets on which it shall accrue shall be sold during administration."
This would give the spouse a pro rata part of the net income earned
by assets sold to pay obligations of the estate, and no longer attributable to any property held at the time of distribution, instead of giving all of such income to the residuary beneficiaries, as the proposed
legislation provides in subsection "e."
These provisions are, of course, not intended to be either comprehensive or especially desirable; they are suggested to remind draftsmen
to have the testator, if he is so minded, make up his mind one way or
the other. If he is satisfied to let the law take its course, and the proposed legislation is enacted, at least the draftsman will be in a position to tell him what the law is, rather than be forced to say that the
law is unsettled and he is not certain what will happen.
IV. EFFECTS UPON DETERMINING INCOME TAX
While a discussion of income tax problems of estates, like that of
allocation between principal and income, is wholly beyond the scope
of this article, the writers feel that the time is overdue for somebody
to say in print that the determination of net income for tax purposes
and the determination of what an income beneficiary is entitled to are
two entirely different problems; and it is only by sheer coincidence that
the two will be the same.
Gross income may be different for the two purposes. When unproductive real estate, for example, is sold during the first year of administration by an executor, no income is realized for income tax
purposes. The property is evaluated at the sales price for estate tax
purposes, and the basis and price are the same. No gain is realized. On
the other hand, as between the life tenant and remainderman, the sales
price is allocated between principal and income, and the income beneficiary of the property must be given his share. 60
10See note 27 supra.
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Similarly, deductions may be different. Litigation costs incurred by
the executor are deductible from income in the determination of income taxes."' The nature of the litigation, on the other hand, may determine what part of its costs are allocated to principal and what part
to income in determining the respective amounts owing to the income
beneficiary and those entitled to corpus. 62
While the principle stated is clear, it is easy for the personal representative to be puzzled over reaching two different amounts of net income for the same year; and occasionally to dread having to account for
the difference to some of the representatives of the Internal Revenue
Service with whom he has to deal.
Despite the difference, there will be many items that will receive
the same treatment for both determinations; and the bookkeeping required to determine how the income from estates is to be distributed,
under existing law and the legislation herein proposed, will be helpful
to the determination of net income for tax purposes.
V. CONCLUSION

The obligation of the law to approach maximum clarity increases
with the responsibility which it imposes. While the income and interest
problems of many estates might well be close to de minimis, and might
be dismissed by one engaged in ordinary business transactions as not
worth bothering about, the conscientious fiduciary feels that he has not
done a good job until he has got his accounts precisely straight. Sometimes, of course, the problems are not de minimus; and, especially if
infants or unborn persons are interested, the personal representatives
have no alternative but to resort to court proceedings.
It is the hope of the writers that this article will stimulate the thinking of others on the subject matter; and that, eventually, the collective
judgment of those affected may work out a solution that will be as satisfactory as possible, and will have the virtue of being definite.

O1Loyd v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 416 (Ct. CL., 1957).
234 C.J.S., Executors & Administrators § 535 (1942)-

